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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF r:eHE ESTATE 
of 
No. 8809 
HILLARD L. VOORHEES, 
Deceased. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This is an interlocutory appeal granted by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Utah on April 2, 1958, from 
the Order of the District Court of Sanpete County of 
December 23, 1957, as modified on December 24, 1957, 
appointing Tracy-Collins '"Prust Company ~ue<·e~sor ad-
ministrator of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, De-
ceased. 
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For the sake of clarity in this Brief the parties shall 
be referred to as they appear before this Court. Mrs. 
Pearl 0. Voorhees shall be referred to hereafter as "Ap-
pellant," and the surviving daughters of the deceased 
shall be referred to hereafter as "Respondents." Refer-
ences to the estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, 
shall be referred to as "Estate", and the District Court of 
Sanpete County shall be referred to hereafter as "Court." 
References to the record of the Court below shall be as 
follows: (R-1). References to the transcript of the pro-
ceedings of the Court below shall be as follows: (Tr-1). 
STATE~IEXT OF FACTS 
Hillard L. Voorhees died intestate in Manti, Sanpete 
County, State of Utah, on the 24th day of July, 1956, 
leaving surviving him as his sole and only heirs at law 
the Appellant and the Respondents. 
On September 2-1, 1956, the Appellant filed Petition 
for Letters of Administration of the Estate (R-1, 2). On 
October 24, 1956, Letters of Administration were granted 
to the Appellant by the Court (R-9) and on October 29, 
1956, t Jw Court ordered the .Appellant appointed Admin-
il"t.ratrix of the Estate (R-8). 
On Septen1ber ~5. 1957. the Respondents filed a 
Petition for Revocation of Letters of .Administration pre-
vioul"ly granted to thP .Appellant, together with a Motion 
for Order to Show Cause based upon said Petition (R-29, 
34). The Petition for R.evocation of Letters of Adminis· 
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tration basically alleged that the Appellant as Adminis-
tratrix had neglected the affairs of the Estate in that 
she had failed to account for property of the Estate 
coming into the Appellant's possession, and, further, 
said Petition requested that the Walker Bank & Trust 
Company be appointed successor administrator of the 
Estate. Hearing of said Petition for Revocation of 
Letters of Administration and Order to Show Cause was 
held before the Court on October 21, 1957. 
At the commencement of the hearing on October 21, 
1957, it was stipulated between counsel for Respondents 
and counsel for Appellant that the Appellant would re-
sign as Administratrix of the Estate and Walker Bank & 
Trust Company be appointed successor administrator 
(Tr-31, 32). The Court subsequently entered its oral 
Order that the Letters of Administration previously 
granted to the Appellant be revoked on stipulation of 
counsel, and appointed the Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany as successor administrator (Tr-109). Evidence was 
then received by the Court at the October 21, 1957, hear-
ing concerning the property of the Estate and its loca-
tion for the purpose of future actions ( Tr-4, ()). Pursuant 
to the Stipulation of counsel the Court on October 28, 
1957, entered its Order Revoking the Letters of Admin-
istration and appointing Walker Bank & r:rrust Company 
successor administrator of the Estate (R-86), and it 
was further Ordered hy the Court that the Appellant 
make an accounting of the property of the Estate on 
or before 20 days from October 28, 19tr7. Two extensions 
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of time were granted to the Appellant for filing a final 
report and accounting as Ad1ninistratrix of the Estate 
(R-87, 98). 
At the request of Respondents on December 6, 1957, 
the Walker Bank & Trust Company filed its rejection of 
appointment as successor administrator of the Estate 
(Tr-117, R-99), and on the same date the Respondents 
petitioned for the appointment of Tracy-Collins Trust 
Company as successor administrator (R-100, 102). Based 
upon the Respondents' Petition for Appointment of 
Successor Administrator dated Deceinber 6, 1957, the 
Court issued an Order to Show 8ause why Appellant 
should not be held in contempt for failing to file her 
accounting of the Estate and why Appellant had not for-
feited her right to serve as Administratrix or to desig-
nate or appoint a successor administrator. Hearing on 
the Petition for Appointment of Successor Administra-
tor of Respondents was set for Dece1nber 16, 1957. An 
Answer to Respondents' Petition for ~-\.ppointment of 
Successor Administrator was filed by ~-\. ppellant alleging 
that the Appellant had not filed her accounting as A.d-
ministratrix in view of the Order of the Court dated 
December 2, 1957, extending the tiine of said filing for 20 
days, and that in no 1nanner had the Appellant waived 
her preferential right to n01nina te a successor adminis-
trator of the Estate. The Appellant's Answer further 
nominated Walker Bank & Trust COinpan~- as successor 
admini,stra tor of the Est at~ ( R-1 08-11 :2). On D~cember 
16, 1957, the Walker Bank &. 'rrust C01upany tendered 
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to the Court itH Notice of Revocation of it:; previou::; re-
jection as administrator (R-114) and also qualified by 
tendering to the Court executed Letters of Adminis-
tration for administration of the Estate (R-113). A 
hearing was held before the Court on December 16, 1957, 
at which time the Trust Officer of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company, Mr. Claire Mortenson, testified as to the rea-
sons for the revocation of its previous rejection of 
Letters of Administration (Tr-129). The Court at the 
close of this hearing entered its oral Order appointing 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company successor administrator 
(Tr. 160). 
The Order appointing successor administrator (R-
121, 122) from which this interlocutory appeal was grant-
ed was entered by the Court on December 21, 1957, as 
modified by the letter of the Judge of the Court below 
dated December 24, 1957 (R-165, 166). The Order of the 
Court appointed Tracy-Collins Trust Company as suc-
cessor Administrator of the Estate, restated in part the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which were 
filed on the same date (R-115, 118). In substance these 
Findings restated in the Order were that Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company was legally competent to serve as suc-
cessor administrator of the Estate, and that Walker Bank 
& Trust Company heretofore had filed its Notice of Re-
jection of Letters of Administration because of its policy 
not to become involved in litigation against a surviving 
widow who rnakes an adverse claim and owns propert~' 
as against the claim of the J1Jstate, and that 1,racy-Collins 
Trust Company would act fairly and impartially in 
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administering the affairs of the Estate. The offer of 
Walker Bank & Trust Company to withdraw its rejec-
tion of appointment as successor administrator of the 
Estate was refused by the Court unless Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company should fail or refuse to execute its oath 
of office within five days from the date of the Order, 
in that event the Court would consider an informal Mo-
tion on five days notice for the reinstatement of Walker 
Bank & Trust Company. 
STATEMENT OF POIKTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW IN APPOINTING TRACY-COLLINS 
TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF HILLARD L. VOORHEES, DENIED THE AP-
PELLANT'S PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR AD::\IINISTRATOR 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 75-4-1 and 75-6-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE APPELLANT IN SO::\IE MANNER HAD 
EITHER WAIVED OR CONDUCTED HERSELF AS ADMINIS-
TRATRIX SO AS TO LOSE HER PREFERENTIAL RIGHT 
TO NOMINATE A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR TO THE 
ESTATE, THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, BY 
FILING A REVOCATION OF ITS PRIOR REJECTION OF 
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE APPOINT-
MENT OF TRA·CY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUC-
CESSOR ADMINISTRATOR, HAD A PRIOR RIGHT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE, AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF DECEMBER 21, 1957, IN NOT 
APPOINTING WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY SUC-
CESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE. 
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ARGUl\tlEN'r 
POINT I. 
THE COURT BELOW IN APPOINTING TRACY-COLLINS 
TRUST COMPANY SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
ESTATE OF HILLARD L. VOORHEES, DENIED THE AP-
PELLANT'S PREFERENTIAL STATUTORY RIGHT FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR 
UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 75-4-1 and 75-6-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
By the Court's Order of Dece1nber 21, 1957 (R-119), 
Tracy-Collins Trust Company was appointed successor 
administrator of the Estate and Letters of Administra-
tion were to be issued to the Tracy-Collins Trust Com-
pany upon their taking and subscribing the oath as re-
quired by law on or before December 21, 1957, this ap-
pointment being pursuant to the Petition of Respondents 
(R-101). The Appellant in Answer to the Petition for 
successor administrator filed by the Respondents nomi-
nated Walker Bank & Trust Company to be successor ad-
ministrator to herself (R-111). 
Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, im;ofar as applicable, 
provides as follows: 
"To whom granted Ad1ninistration of the es-
tate of a person dying intestate must be granted 
to some one or Inore of the person:::; hereinafter 
1nentioned, the relatives of the deceased being en-
titled to administer only when they are entitled 
to succeed to his personal estate or some portion 
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thereof; and they are respectively, entitled there-
to in the following order: 
(1) The surviving husband or "Wife; 
( 2) The children ... 
Administration may be granted to one or more 
competent persons although not otherwise en-
titled to the same at the written request of the 
person entitled filed in the Court." 
The Appellant exercised her preferential right for 
appointment as Administratrix of the Estate by filing 
her petition for Letters of Administration on September 
24, 1956, the date of the demise of the deceased being 
July 24, 1956. This exercise of preferential right was 
accomplished within the time limit of three months pro-
vided in 75-4-3, U.C.A., 1953. 
The Appellant designated a successor administra-
tor, the Walker Bank & Trust Company, as is provided 
in Section 75-6-3 U.C.A., 1953, which provides: 
"Appointment of a successor-In case of the 
removal, resignation, or death of one of several 
Executors or Ad1ninistrators. the Court, if it 
deems it necessary. Inay appoint a successor or 
may permit the ren1aining executor or executors, 
administrator or adn1inistrators. to cmnplete the 
exe~ution of the trust. In case of the death, resig-
nat~on ~r removal of all, the Court shall, upon 
no!1ce, .~ssue Letters to the person ha ring the 
pnor nght thereto, or to any competent person 
named by the person having such prior riqht . .. " 
(Emphasis ours.) " · 
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The language of 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, manifests a 
clear legislative intent to continue the preferential right 
of 75-4-1 U.C.A., 1953, to apply to the appointment of 
successor administrators in the event of resignation 
or removal of an administrator. It will be noted that the 
preferential right of nominating a successor adminis-
b·ator under 75-6-3 U.C.A., 1953, is granted even in the 
event of "removal" of the administrator. The only quali-
fication placed upon the exercise of this preferential right 
of nomination of successor administrator in 75-6-3 U.C.A., 
1953, is that the nominee be "competent." The Appellant 
after termination of her period as Administratrix of the 
Estate nominated the Walker Bank & Trust Company to 
act as successor administrator of the Estate. Although 
Respondents may argue that the Court found Walker 
Bank & Trust Company "incompetent" in the Findings 
of Fact made by the Court (R-115-118), it is paradoxical 
that the Court previously considered Walker Bank & 
Trust Company "cmnpetent" to act as successor admin-
istrator of the Estate (Tr-32), and in the Order from 
which this appeal is taken the Court further states it 
will consider the appointment of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company as successor administrator of the Estate (R-
121). The Court's own actions negate any inference of a 
lack of competency on the part of Walker Bank & Trust 
Company to serve as successor administrator of the 
Estate. 
The revocation of Letters of Administration of the 
Appellant (R-86) could not constitute a waiver or a legal 
deprivation of the preferential right of the Appellant to 
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nominate the successor administrator of the Estate. 
Before proceeding further, let us examine the circum-
stances surrounding the Court's Order revoking the 
Letters of Administration of the Appellant and appoint-
ing Walker Bank & Trust Company successor adminis-
trator of the Estate. This Order resulted from a hearing 
before the Court on October 21, 1957. The purpose of the 
hearing was to determine the merits of the Petition for 
Revocation of Letters of Administration filed by the 
Respondents. As was cogently stated by counsel for the 
Respondents at the commencement of this hearing, its 
purpose was : 
"Mr. Nielsen: And this proceeding is for the 
purpose of examining her concerning where that 
property may be and whether she claims an ad-
verse interest, and to ask that an independent and 
impartial person be appointed administrator so 
as to take such action as 1nay be necessary to 
bring that property in to the estate. 
We are not asking the Court to pass upon, 
at this time, the ownership of the property. If she 
could clann adversely, I don't know whether she 
will claim it adversely or not. but if she does, 
under the Section under which we brought it the 
Court is not required, need not pass upon the 
ownership of it. 
But we think an adn1inistrator which is im-
partial and free fron1 prejudice and has no con-
flicting int.en·~t in the estate should be appoint-
ed to look Into the 111atter and to take such action 
as Inay be necessary." c~rr-4). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
In response to the opening statement by counsel for 
the Respondents, counsel for the Appellant stated: 
"Mr. Worsley: Your Honor, it would appear 
to us that the essential purpose of the hearing 
this morning deals with the question as to whether 
or not Mrs. Voorhees should continue as adminis-
tratrix. We have given the 1natter some thought, 
Your Honor, and believe that under the circum-
stances here, since apparently there are adverse 
claims existent, that it would be best if the court 
did permit her to resign and to substitute another 
administrator until this matter is resolved. 
I would like to nmke very clear to the court 
and to counsel for petitioners, as well as the peti-
tioners themselves, that we do not in any sense 
concede that their claims have any foundation. 
Quite contrary. But there would appear to be a 
conflict of interest and under those circumstances 
we feel that she would, should be, would be willing 
to step aside for the time being. I make it clear, 
however, also to the court that in all probability 
when such conflict has been resolved we may again 
petition to have her re-appointed." (Tr-5). 
The counsel for the respective partie:::; indicated to 
the Court their assent to the appointment of Walker 
Bank & Trust Company as successor administrator (Tr-
5, 6). The nature of the stipulation for resignation of 
the Appellant is clearly set out by counsel for the re-
spective parties and the Court : 
".Mr. Niel:::;en: ln view of the stipulation he-
tween the partie:::; will Your Honor indieate to 
counsel at this time that the, he will accept the 
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resignation of Mrs. Voorhees and appoint the 
Walker Bank so that we may proceed on that 
basis and have them qualify~ 
* * * 
The Court: If she is going to stipulate to her 
attorneys she will resign, that is one thing. 
Whether the court will force her to is another 
thing. 
Mr. Worsley: She has stated to the court, 
and so states through us, that she is willing to 
resign, Your Honor, and consents that Walker 
Bank and Trust Company be appointed in her 
stead, administrator DBN. 
Mr. Nielsen: Would Your Honor indicate 
that you would be willing to have that done, or to 
make a direction in the record so that we can 
proceed. That is the thing that I wanted the 
court to do. 
The Court: "\Yell, on stipulation of counsel 
I wouldn't have any objection to it.'' (Tr-31, 32). 
From the colloquy between the Court and counsel 
on October 21, 1957, it is quite apparent that the Court 
revoked the Letters of Administration solely upon the 
grounds of the stipulation between Counsel, and the same 
is reflected in the Order Revoking the Letters of Adminis-
tration and appointing a successor adn1inistrator (R-86, 
Tr-31, 32). As stated by counsel for Respondents, Mr. 
Nielsen, (Tr-107): 
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"Ye:::;, pur:::;uant to a request for resignation. 
We have both :::;tipulated that :::;he may resign. 
I haven't pressed the point of whether she should 
be compelled to. She has asked the Court to let 
her and I am willing to let her resign." (Tr-107). 
The evidence adduced at the hearing of October :n, 
1957, was, according to counsel for Respondents, for the 
purpose of determining the property included within the 
Estate and its location (Tr-4, 6). From the evidence pre-
sented the Court made no finding of mismanagement, 
waste or failure to cornply with the Order:::; of the Court 
by the Appellant as Administratrix of the Estate in re-
voking the letters of Administration of the Appellant. 
The Letters of Administration were not revoked for 
cause, but rather by stipulation of the parties. It is 
respectfully submitted, therefore, that the appellant has 
in no fashion waived her preferential right to nominate 
a successor administrator even though she disqualified 
herself to act by resigning as Administratrix. 
The preferential right for appointment of adminis-
trators and their successors as outlined in Sections 75-4-1 
and 75-6-3, U.C.A., 1953, has been upheld by our Court 
when the person with the preferential right has exercised 
it in accordance with the Statutes of this State as was 
done by the Appellant in the instant case. Three Utah 
cases aptly demonstrate the Court's attitude toward 
this preferential right: 
The first is In Re Pingree's Estate, (1929), 74 lltah 
38-!, 279 P. 901. In this case the widow of the dPeea~P(l 
petitioned for Letters of Administration. A number of 
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her children objected to her appointrnent as administra-
trix and filed a cross-petition for the appointment of one 
of the sons of the deceased as administrator. The lower 
Court denied the widow her preferential right on the 
grounds that there was some hostility between the widow 
and the other heirs, and likely to be quarrels and friction 
between herself and the other heirs, and that because 
of this conflict her administration would not be impartial. 
It also found that she had not filed her petition for ap-
pointment as administratrix within the requisite three 
months statutory period. The Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, in reversing the lower Court and granting 
to the widow her preferential right to be administra-
trix, stated at page 903: 
"The Trial Court having found that Appel-
lant is a competent person to be charged with the 
administration of the affairs of the estate and in-
asmuch as her application was made within the 
prescribed time fixed by Compiled Laws of rtah, 
1917, Section 7598, she was entitled to Letters of 
Administration of the Estate of the deceased as 
a matter of right, in the absence of showing some 
good and sufficient reason to the contrary. In Re 
Owen's Estate, 30 Utah 351.85 Pac. 2Ti: In Re Sla-
ter's Estate, 55 Utah :25:2, 18-± Pac. 1017, it is con-
ceded by respondents that the right to administer 
the estate is a valuable right. Appellant, more 
than any other single individual, is interested in 
the economical and expeditious administration 
of its affairs." 
The second ease is lu Re Johnson's Estate, (1934), 
84 Utah 186, 35 P. 2d 305. In the Johnson case, the widow 
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of the deceased had filed an action for divorce and the 
interlocutory decree was granted about one month before 
his death. The brother of the deceased petitioned for 
Letters of Administration and was appointed Adminis-
trator. The widow then dismissed the divorce action and 
petitioned for removal of the brother as administrator, 
and petitioned for her own nominee to become administra-
trix of the estate of her deceased husband. The lower 
Court removed the brother as administrator and appoint-
ed the nominee of the widow as the administratrix. This 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah. The Supreme Court in commenting on 
the then Section 102-4-1 Rev. Stat. of l't., 1933, (now 
Section 75-4-1, U.C.A., 1953) stated: 
". . . Under the provisions of the compiled 
Laws of Utah 1917, Section 7596, now Section 102-
4-1, Supra, she was entitled to have Letters of Ad-
ministration of the estate of the deceased issued to 
her as a matter of right, in the absence of showing 
of some good and sufficient reason to the contrary 
. . . a person having a preferential right may 
nominate another to assume the administration of 
the estate. Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 
102-4-3. Obviously, where a person having a pre-
ferred right nominates a competent person, the 
appointment of such nominee is mandatory." 
The third case supporting the Appellant's conten-
tion that she has been denied her preferential right by the 
Order of the Court below, is In Re Martin's Estate (1946), 
109 Utah 131, 166 P. 2d 197. In the l\lartin case, the 
surviving daughter filed a petition for appointment of 
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herself as adminstratrix of both her parents' estates. 
The children of her deceased sister filed a cross-petition 
objecting to her appointment on the grounds that the 
surviving daughter was a married woman. This objection 
was well taken under the then operative Utah Statute, 
and, therefore, the surviving daughter nominated one 
Nelson to be administrator. The lower Court would not 
appoint Nelson as administrator, and appointed another 
who subsequently resigned. Then Nelson's nomination 
was revived, and he was appointed administrator. Nelson 
then refused to qualify, and after his failure to qualify, 
the surviving daughter petitioned for one Christensen to 
be appointed administrator of the estates of her deceased 
parents. The lower Court appointed her nominee, and 
an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. The Supreme Court upheld the appointment 
of the lower Court and found that even though the sur-
viving daughter of the deceaseds was rendered incom-
petent, she was not deprived of her right to nominate an 
administrator nor had she waived her right when she 
nominated a person who refused to qualify and act. The 
Court, through Justice Turner, at page 199 stated: 
"Mrs. Reynolds became disqualified to serve 
when objection was made as provided in the Stat· 
ute but such disqualification did not render her 
incompetent to n01ninate. This right w·as not ex-
hausted when she n01ninated Nelson and he re-
fused to qualify and act. It should be re1nembered 
that Mrs. Reynolds filed her Petition for Letters 
shortly after the death of her father and within 
the three months period prescribed by the statute, 
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and tlm~ pre~erved thi~ right. ~ee Section 102-
-1:-3, r tah Code Annotated, 1943. ln Re Johnson's 
Estate, S-l- Utah 168, 35 P. :2d 305; ln Re Smith':.; 
Estate, 85 Utah 606, -±0 P. 2d 180; In Re Owen's 
Estate, 30 Utah 351, 85 Pac. :277. Even though 
the Statute declares them to be incompetent to 
administer an estate, infants and incompetents, 
through guardian~ and non-resident heirs, may 
exercise the right of nomination under the Statute. 
Appellant~ do not ~eriously contend that there 
i~ merit to their argument that Mrs. Reynolds 
•waived' her right to nominate. A right cannot 
be waived by exercising it. Had she failed to 
file a petition for Letters of Administration with-
in the statutory period, ~he might have waived 
her right to nominate." 
lt is re~pectfully ~ubmitted that the Appellant in 
the instant case has in no manner waived her right to 
nominate a successor administrator, as a matter of fact 
she has reserved this right by, first, filing as Adminis-
tratrix, and second, by nominating a successor adminis-
trator. It is ~ubmitted that no finding or proof 
has been adduced in the record of the Court below to 
substantiate any denial by the Court of her preferential 
right to nominate a ~ucces~or administrator. 
The Supreme Court of the ~tate of Utah in the ana-
logous cases set forth above has jealously guarded the 
preferential right of the person granted h~, Statute to 
nominate an admini~trator or succes~or adminit-1trator. 
The Order of the Court he low from whieh tit it-1 Appeal 
was granted flaunt~ a clear line of case law and statu-
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tory authority in failing to honor the preferential right 
of the Appellant to appoint her nominee as successor 
administrator of the Estate. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE APPELLANT IN SOME MANNER HAD 
EITHER WAIVED OR CONDUCTED HERSELF AS ADMINIS-
TRATRIX SO AS TO LOSE HER PREFERENTIAL RIGHT 
TO NOMINATE A SUCCESSOR ADMINISTRATOR TO THE 
ESTATE, THE WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, BY 
FILING A REVOCATION OF ITS PRIOR REJECTION OF 
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE APPOINT-
MENT OF TRA·CY-COLLINS TRUST COMPANY AS SUC-
CESSOR ADMINISTRATOR, HAD A PRIOR RIGHT TO THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE, AND THE COURT 
ERRED IN ITS ORDER OF DECEMBER 21, 1957, IN NOT 
APPOINTING WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY SUC-
CESSOR ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE. 
The Walker Bank & Trust Company rejected its ap-
pointment as successor administrator of the Estate on 
December 6, 1957 (R-99), pursuant to the request of 
Respondents (Tr-118). On Dece1nber 16, 1957, \\:.,.alker 
Bank & Trust Company filed with the Court its revoca-
tion of previous rejection of Letters of Aillninistration 
and executed and tendered Letters of Aillninistration (R-
113, 114), and further stated its desire to qualify as suc-
cessor administrator of the Estate. ~lt the hearing before 
the Court on December 16, 1957. the Court considered 
the problem of appointiuent of a successor aillninistrator 
of the Estate, i.e. whether to appoint the nonunee of the 
Appellant or the non1inee of the Respondents. The Court, 
at the close of the hearing of Dece1nber 16, 1957, denied 
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the application of Walker Bank & Trust Company to be 
reinstated as successor administrator and appointed 
Tracy-Collins Trust Cmnpany ''substitute ad1ninistrator'' 
(Tr-160). 
The general rule in this situation is set forth in 33 
C.J.S. 955, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 47 (d) : 
"d. Retraction of Renunciation 
Broadly speaking a renunciation may be re-
tracted before, but not after, appointment of an-
other to the office of administrator, and in cases 
of doubt the matter is addressed to the discretion 
of the Court. 
While retraction of a renunciation of the 
right to administer a decedent's estate is not 
favored, such retraction is ordinarily permissible 
prior to the grant of administration to another, 
and it has been held that the question of permit-
ting a retraction is committed to the sound dis-
cretion of the court. Generally speaking, however, 
retraction should not be permitted while proceed-
ings for the appointment of another are pending 
or after another person has been appointed to 
the office, unless it appears to the satisfaction of 
the court that the renunciation wai:J executed by 
a mistake." 
It is respectfully sub1nitted that Walker Bank & 
Trust Company submitted its rejection of administration 
under the mistaken belief that it had to fulfill certain 
committmeniS to Respondents and thPir eounsel (Tr-
129). On reconsideration at the request of the Appellant 
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the Walker Bank & Trust Company determined that 
it could do a service to the Estate by qualifying as ad-
ministrator. Mr. Clair J\1:ortensen, Trust Officer, Walker 
Bank & Trust Company, testified as to the reasons for 
his company's actions stating that it was the policy of 
the Walker Bank & Trust Company to provide an im-
partial, unbiased administration and to avoid litigation 
by the Estate unless it would be in the best interests of 
the Estate (Tr-129, 130, 131, 135). 
At the conclusion of the hearing of December 16, 
1957, without any examination of the other successor ad-
ministrator nominee, the Court appointed Tracy-Collins 
Trust Company successor administrator. Under such 
ill-advised circumstances the Court made its appointment 
rejecting the appointment of "Talker Bank & Trust Com-
pany. Such action by the Court is not only contrary to 
the law, but also an abuse of its discretionary power. 
Here a previously acceptable administrator was rejected 
by the Court even though it had offered to qualify as ad-
ministrator before the Court had appointed another ad-
ministrator. And the Court did not ever see fit to ex-
amine the qualifications of the appointed adlninistrator. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant by the Order of the Court from which 
this appeal was granted has been deprived of her pre-
ferential right to nominate and have appointed the 
Walker Bank & Trust C01npany successor ad1ninistrator 
of the Estate of her deceased husband. The action of the 
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Court appointing rl,raey-Collint5 Trut5t Company sueeessor 
administrator not only ignored the statutory right of 
the Appellant, but also failed to consider and apply the 
general rule that a renunciation of administration can be 
retracted before the appointinent of a suecessor adminis-
trator, as was done h!· Walker Bank & Trust Cmnpany 
in the instant case. 
The Appellant submits that the Order of the Court 
below appointing Tracy-Collins Trust Company success-
or administrator of the Estate should be reversed and 
that the Walker Bank & Trust Cmnpany should be ap-
pointed succes~;or administrator of the 1£state. 
Respectfully ::mbmitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
and JAMES A. MURPHY 
AttoTneys for- Appellant 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
